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TECHNOLOGY POLICY, INTERNET PRIVACY, AND THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Anthony Ciolli
11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 176 (2009)
Technology policy, while perhaps not as high-profile as the
war in Iraq or health care, was an important issue in the 2008
presidential campaign. Though technology policy is a broad field
that encompasses everything from broadband proliferation to
patent reform, the major presidential candidates addressed the
necessary balance the government must strike between privacy and
other national interests. This was particularly true of candidates
who served in the U.S. Senate. In that body, a bill, S. 2248, which
proposed retroactive immunity for telecommunications companies
who opened up their networks to intelligence agencies in violation
of federal privacy law, was introduced during the height of the
primary campaign season. Senator John McCain, commenting on
that bill, stated that he was "a strong supporter of protecting the
privacy of Americans" and, even if retroactive immunity was
justified in that particular case, "Congress should include
provisions that ensure that Americans' private records will not be
dealt with like that again. ' Similarly, Senator Barack Obama
announced that, as president, he would "strengthen privacy
protections for the digital age and . . . harness the power of
technology to hold government and business accountable for
violations of personal privacy."2
But while the candidates discussed the tension between
privacy rights and the war on terror, they said little about how a
similar tension between privacy and other governmental objectives
should be resolved in the context of civil litigation. This issue has
become especially important in recent years, as plaintiffs are
increasingly using the civil subpoena process to force anonymous
Internet speakers to unveil their identities. Yet neither the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure nor comparable legislation address the
issue of when Internet intermediaries must be compelled to provide
private information about Internet users to litigants.
As a consequence of the statutory silence on this issue,
courts have reached widely divergent results, developing at least
I Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Technology Voters' Guide: John
McCain, CNET NEWS, Jan. 3, 2008, http://www.news.com/Technology-Voters-
Guide-John-McCain/2100-1028 3-6224285.html.
2 Barack Obama & Joe Biden: Technology, http://www.barackobama.com/
issues/technology/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2008).
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five different tests to answer this question. Since these tests
require different elements or otherwise bear little resemblance to
each other, the lack of a uniform national standard for disclosure,
and the potential for yet another completely new test, has resulted
in substantial confusion, leaving no guidance for litigants,
intermediaries, and Internet users to understand what
circumstances justify disclosure of otherwise confidential
information.
This essay will advocate for a technology policy in
President Barak Obama's new administration that will provide
adequate privacy protection for Internet users in the civil subpoena
context. Part I will provide an overview of the First Amendment
right to speak anonymously on the Internet. Part II will briefly
summarize the different tests various courts have adopted over the
past ten years to weigh an Internet user's First Amendment and
privacy rights against a litigant's right to use the court system to
obtain redress for alleged injuries. Part III will outline four
guiding principles that technology policy in this area should
follow, ultimately arguing that the new administration should
request that Congress amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to require that federal courts nationwide apply a "summary
judgment plus" test to all instances where a litigant demands an
Internet user's identity or other private information as part of the
discovery process.
I. INTERNET USERS HAVE A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
SPEAK ANONYMOUSLY ON THE INTERNET
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
right to speak anonymously is protected under the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.3 The Court, in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Committee, described anonymity as "a shield from
the tyranny of the majority" and wrote that anonymity
"exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation - and their ideas from suppression . . . . The
McIntyre Court further held that "the interest in having anonymous
works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs
any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry,"
and thus, "an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other
decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a
3 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n., 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
4 514 U.S. at 357.
2008-2009
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publication, is an aspect of the freedom protected by the First
Amendment." 5 The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
anonymous speech has "played an important role in the progress of
mankind.,
6
The Supreme Court has already held that First Amendment
rights - including the right to speak anonymously - are not
bound by medium, and thus extend to the Internet. The Court has
described the Internet as "a vast platform from which to address
and hear from a worldwide audience of millions" where "any
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox." 7 As a result, the
Court has found that there is "no basis for qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that applies to this medium."
8
Numerous lower courts have also explicitly acknowledged that full
First Amendment protections extend to anonymous Internet
speech. 9
The Supreme Court has further held that "[t]he loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. ' 1° This irreparable
injury is especially egregious when it involves the unmasking of an
anonymous Internet user.1 1 Because the injury in such situations is
irreparable, the Court has found that an attempt to use a civil
subpoena or other court order to compel discovery of an
individual's identity constitutes "governmental action" that "is
subject to the closest scrutiny."12 As a result, "discovery requests
seeking to identify anonymous Internet users must be subjected to
careful scrutiny by the courts," and "[c]ourts should impose a high
threshold on subpoena requests that encroach on this right" to
5 Id. at 342.
6 Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
7 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853, 870 (1997).
'Id. at 870.
9 See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097 (W.D. Wash.
2001) ("[T]he constitutional rights of Internet users, including the First
Amendment right to speak anonymously, must be carefully safeguarded."); Doe
v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) ("It is clear that speech over the
internet is entitled to First Amendment protection. This protection extends to
anonymous internet speech.").
10 Elrod v. Burnes, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
I See Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 50 (Pa. 2003) ("[l]t is clear that once
Appellants' identities are disclosed, their First Amendment claim is irreparably
lost as there are no means by which to later cure such disclosure.").
12 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
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anonymous speech. 13 As one district court judge put it, "[p]eople
who have committed no wrong should be able to participate online
without the fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass
them can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the
court's order to discover their identities." 14 Any standard other
than the highest level of scrutiny thus fundamentally jeopardizes
"the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas" that "Internet
anonymity facilitates."
' 5
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT TESTS COURTS HAVE
ADOPTED
Although courts must apply the highest level of scrutiny to
any civil subpoena that seeks an anonymous Internet speaker's
identity or other private information, courts have not reached a
consensus as to what this entails, or which particular elements or
factors a litigant must fulfill in order to demonstrate that a
litigant's need for the speaker's identity outweighs the speaker's
First Amendment and privacy rights. This section will provide a
brief overview of five of the different tests various federal and
state courts have adopted.
A. The Seescandy.com Motion to Dismiss Test
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, in Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, 6 became
one of the first courts to consider the issue of when an Internet
intermediary must comply with a subpoena seeking the identity of
an anonymous defendant. The court, with no precedent to guide its
decision, nevertheless recognized that "some limiting principles
should apply to the determination of whether discovery to uncover
the identity is warranted."1 7 But despite this recognition and the
acknowledgment that a lenient procedure could potentially make it
easier for litigants to "harass or intimidate" anonymous speakers,'
8
the Seescandy. corn court established a test making it very easy to
use the discovery process to unmask an anonymous speaker.
The Seescandy. corn court laid out four requirements that a
plaintiff must meet in order to obtain discovery. The court found
13 2TheAlfart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1093, 1097.
14 Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
15 2TheAlfart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
16 185 F.R.D. 573.
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that the requesting party "should identify the missing party with
sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that
defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal
court." 19 Such a "requirement is necessary to ensure that federal
requirements of jurisdiction and justiciability can be satisfied.,
20
After meeting this requirement, the requesting party would
then have to "identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive
defendant., 21 The court found that this requirement is necessary to
"ensur[e] that plaintiffs make a good faith effort to comply with
the requirements of service of process and specifically identifying
defendants. 22 The method used to attempt to notify the defendant
need not comply with the service requirements in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure - they just need to "show that [they have]
made a good faith effort to specifically identify defendant and to
serve notice on defendant.,
23
The third, and key, requirement of the test is that the
"plaintiff should establish to the Court's satisfaction that plaintiff s
suit against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss. 24 In
its discussion of this element, the court analogized to "the process
used during criminal investigations to obtain warrants," stating that
the motion to dismiss requirement would be akin to the
government showing probable cause, with both serving as "a
protection against the misuse of ex parte procedures to invade the
privacy of one who has done no wrong."25 The fourth requirement
requires the discovering party to "file a request for discovery with
the Court, along with a statement of reasons justifying the specific
discovery requested .... ,26
B. The America Online Good Faith Test
The Circuit Court of Virginia, in In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum to America Online, Inc.,27 explicitly rejected the
Seescandy.com approach. In America Online, the plaintiff had
19 Id
20 id.





26 Id. at 580.
27 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL
1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000).
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issued a subpoena requiring that America Online turn over all
information it had about certain John Doe defendants that the
plaintiff had sued for defamation. 28 Though the court purportedly
attempted to balance "the right to communicate anonymously
against the need 'to assure that those persons who choose to abuse
the opportunities presented by this medium can be made to answer
for such transgressions, ' "29 the court ultimately concluded that a
"legitimate, good faith basis" to allege a cause of action against a
defendant was sufficient to require disclosure of that anonymous
speaker's identity.
30
C. The 2TheMart.com Balancing Test
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, in Doe v. 2TheMart.com,31 was also tasked with
deciding whether a subpoena seeking information about an
anonymous Internet user should be quashed. But unlike
Seescandy.com and America Online, the anonymous speakers in
2TheMart.com were not parties to the litigation, but twenty-three
non-parties who the defendant believed were necessary for a
potential affirmative defense. Consequently, the 2TheMart.com
court believed that a different test than Seescandy.com or America
Online was appropriate, and instead applied a four factor interest
balancing test.
As part of this balancing test, the court found that it must
first consider whether "the subpoena seeking the information was
issued in good faith and not for any improper purpose."32 It is not
necessary for the anonymous speaker to prove malice or
demonstrate that the requesting party has engaged in abuse of
process for this factor to weigh against the requesting party.
Rather, the 2TheMart.com court found that, "while not
demonstrating bad faith per se," blanket requests for information
of large groups of non-party speakers constitute an "apparent
disregard for the privacy and First Amendment rights of the on-line
users."
33
28 Am. Online, 2000 WL 1210372, at *1.
29 Ryan M. Martin, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standard for
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. C0N. L.
REV. 1217, 1228 (2007).
3 0 Am. Online, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8.
31 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
32 Id. at 1095.
33 Id. at 1096.
2008-2009
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The second factor is whether "the information sought
relates to a core claim or defense" in the underlying litigation,34 for
"[o]nly when the identifying information is needed to advance core
claims or defenses can it be sufficiently material to compromise
First Amendment rights." 35 The court found that information that
"relates only to a secondary claim or to one of numerous
affirmative defenses" does not impact the "primary substance of
the case," which "can go forward without disturbing the First
Amendment rights of the anonymous Internet users."
36
But it is not sufficient for the information to merely relate
to a core claim or defense, for the third factor considers whether
"the identifying information is directly and materially relevant to
that claim or defense." 37 Because First Amendment rights are
implicated, a higher standard of relevancy is used than otherwise
contemplated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 38 Innuendos
that the speakers have engaged in illegal conduct are not sufficient,
for First Amendment rights "cannot be nullified by an unsupported
allegation of wrongdoing raised by the party seeking the
information. "
39
Finally, the 2TheMart. corn balancing test examines whether
"information sufficient to establish or disprove that claim or
defense is unavailable from any other source., 40 When the
materials requested are already in the requesting party's possession
or are publicly available, and disclosing the identities of the
anonymous speakers is superfluous, then, a requesting party can
support a defense without "encroaching on the First Amendment
rights of the Internet users."41
D. The Cahill Summary Judgment Test
14 Id. at 1095.
15 Id. at 1096.
36 id.
37 Id. at 1095.
38 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) requires disclosure of any relevant
information that "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). However, "when First
Amendment rights are at stake, a higher threshold of relevancy must be
imposed." 2TheA1fart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
39 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
40 Id. at 1095.
41 Id. at 1097.
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The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Cahill42
represents the first outright rejection by an appellate court of both
the good faith and motion to dismiss tests. The Cahill court, in an
approach later also adopted by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona,43 requires that, in addition to providing
adequate notice, the plaintiff in the underlying litigation
demonstrate that its claims against an anonymous defendant would
withstand a motion for summary judgment on elements that are not
dependent on the defendant's identity.44
Why require that a plaintiffs case withstand a motion for
summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss? The Cahill
court correctly noted that "even silly or trivial libel claims can
easily survive a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff pleads facts
that put the defendant on notice of his claim, however vague or
lacking in detail these allegations may be."45 Given the low
standard of review required at the motion to dismiss stage, as well
as the irreparable injury an anonymous speaker will suffer if his
First Amendment rights are not respected, the court found that the
heightened summary judgment standard is more appropriate in
such cases.46 Anything less, the court stated, would result in a
proliferation of "trivial defamation lawsuits primarily to harass or
to unmask ... critics.,
4 7
Unlike 2TheMart.com, the Cahill court did not require a
balancing test in addition to the notice and summary judgment
requirements. The Cahill court explicitly stated that such a
balancing test is unnecessary, since "[t]he summary judgment test
is itself the balance," with the balancing test purportedly "add[ing]
no protection above and beyond that of the summary judgment test
and needlessly complicat[ing] the analysis. 48
E. The Mobilisa "Summary Judgment Plus" Test
The Arizona Court of Appeals is the most recent court to
consider the Internet anonymity issue. In Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe,49
42 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
43 Best Western Int'l, Inc., v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56014, at *11-12 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006).
44 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460.
45 Id. at 459.
46 Id.
47 ld.
481 d. at 461.
49 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
2008-2009
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the court established the most stringent test applied to such a
situation by essentially combining the Cahill notice and summary
judgment requirements with the 2TheMart.com and balancing
test.50 This method, dubbed by the dissent as a "summary judgment
plus" test, is meant to apply regardless of whether the anonymous
speaker is a defendant or non-party witness to the underlying
litigation.5 2 The New Jersey Superior Court's appellate division, in
Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, has also applied a similar test, though
with slightly different elements.
5 3
The Mobilisa "summary judgment plus" test, though still
imperfect, is, for a multitude of compelling reasons, superior to all
of the other tests various courts have adopted. The following
section, which proposes four key guiding principles that should
apply to technology policy in this area, will explain the advantages
of the Mobilisa test over other approaches, while also
acknowledging and proposing remedies for its drawbacks.
11. INTERNET PRIVACY AND THE CIVIL LITIGATION DISCOVERY
PROCESS: FOUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The new presidential administration should consider four
key guiding principles when shaping policies that would mediate
the tension between Internet privacy and the goals of the civil
litigation process. This section will briefly outline each of those
principles.
A. National Uniformity is Necessary
Given that, over the past decade, courts have developed and
applied at least five different tests to determine whether it is
appropriate to use the civil subpoena process to unmask an
anonymous Internet user, it should go without saying that a
uniform national standard is both desirable and necessary. The
current diversity of tests is especially striking when one considers
how few courts have actually ruled on this question. Since the
overwhelming majority of courts have still not developed
precedent on this issue, the lack of a uniform standard creates
unpredictability. In most jurisdictions, it remains a mystery which
test a court will apply to determine whether a civil subpoena may
be used to unmask an anonymous speaker. Because the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and all federal appellate courts are
5°1d. at 721.
5 1 1d. at 725.
52 Id. at 719.
53 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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currently silent on the issue, no one knows whether a particular
district court will apply a good faith test, a motion to dismiss test, a
summary judgment test, a balancing test, or a completely new test.
When fundamental First Amendment and privacy rights are at
stake, consistent decision making among the federal courts is
needed.
Without a uniform standard, plaintiffs who seek to silence,
intimidate, or otherwise harass their anonymous critics can also
forum shop to take advantage of the radically different tests
applied by the various courts. For instance, a plaintiff, knowing
that the District of Arizona has adopted the Cahill summary
judgment test while the Northern District of California merely
requires that its allegations withstand a motion to dismiss, will,
whenever possible, file suit or issue a subpoena in the Northern
District of California and avoid litigation in Arizona's federal
courts. A uniform national standard, however, would eliminate the
benefits of forum shopping, at least with regard to this issue.
B. An Anonymous Speaker's Status Should Not Matter
But while it may be easy to see the necessity for a uniform
standard, some may question why the Mobilisa "summary
judgment-plus" test should be the standard over the other tests
courts have adopted. One of the main advantages of the "summary
judgment-plus" test is that courts can apply it to every situation
involving an anonymous Internet speaker, whether the speaker is a
defendant or witness, and achieve a fair and just result. The
Mobilisa court itself acknowledged this important benefit,
explicitly "reject[ing] . . . [the] view that courts should apply a
different test when the identity of a witness is at issue."
54
How does the "summary judgment-plus" test facilitate a
just result for both defendant and non-defendant speakers alike?
One simply needs to examine the shortcomings of the other
approaches courts have adopted. The Mobilisa court, in its
explanation of why it declined to apply the Cahill test, stated that
"surviving a summary judgment on elements not dependent on the
anonymous party's identity does not necessarily account for factors
weighing against disclosure." 55 For instance, "the anonymous
speaker may be a non-party witness along with a number of known
witnesses with the same information. "56 In such a situation, "[t]he
requesting party's ability to survive summary judgment would not
account for the fact that ... it may have only a slight need for the
54 Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 719 n.7.
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anonymous party's identity."57 As the Mobilisa court illustrates,
applying any test that does not involve a balancing of the interests
has the potential to bring about unjust results when applied to
anonymous non-party witnesses.
Similarly, applying only a balancing of the interests test, as
in 2TheMart.com, without accounting for the strength of the
plaintiffs' case through a summary judgment requirement would
almost certainly lead to unjust results for many anonymous
defendants. Three of the four 2TheMart.com factors - that the
information sought relates to a core claim, is materially relevant to
that core claim, and cannot be obtained from another source -
will automatically lean in any plaintiff's favor, since the plaintiff's
causes of action could not proceed without the defendant's identity
and presumably the plaintiff would not have identified the
defendant as a "John Doe" and issued a subpoena if it already
knew the defendant's identity or could easily obtain it elsewhere.
The remaining factor - that the subpoena was issued in good faith
- is even weaker than the good faith requirement in America
Online, since a subpoena could be issued in good faith even if
there is no probable cause for the underlying lawsuit. Accordingly,
any test applied to anonymous defendants must involve something
more than just a balancing of the interests.
The above mentioned benefits, of course, are dependent on
the assumption that the same test should apply regardless of
whether the anonymous speaker is a defendant or a witness. Thus,
if - like the dissenting judge in Mobilisa - one believes that
different tests should apply based on the anonymous speaker's
status, the benefits of a "summary judgment plus" approach
become less clear. However, compelling reasons exist for
applying the same test to both anonymous defendants and
witnesses.
Just as applying different tests in different district courts
promotes forum shopping, applying one test for anonymous
defendants and another for anonymous witnesses promotes
frivolous lawsuits and gives plaintiffs the opportunity to frame
their claims in a way to best maximize their chances of identifying
particular anonymous speakers. The Mobilisa court acknowledged
this danger, finding that "adopting different standards could
encourage assertion of ... claims simply to reap the benefits of a
less-stringent standard., 58 A plaintiff abusing the presence of
different standards is a particular concern in the context of strategic
lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPP suits, where the
57 id.
5 1id. at 719.
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plaintiffs' goal is not to actually recover damages for a legitimate
injury, but to silence or harass a critic.
59
For instance, in a jurisdiction where the Cahill summary
judgment test applies to anonymous defendants and the
2TheMart. corn balancing test applies to witnesses, one can imagine
a plaintiff whose ultimate goal is not to win, but to silence or
harass an anonymous critic, choosing to file a frivolous lawsuit
against a known party and identifying the anonymous critic as a
necessary witness. After obtaining the speaker's identity, the
plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss the initial lawsuit against the
known party and initiate new proceedings against the unmasked
speaker that, while not even capable of withstanding a motion to
dismiss, will nevertheless force the speaker to incur substantial
attorneys' fees and deter other speakers from criticizing the
plaintiff. In this perverse scenario, an anonymous speaker would
have actually been better off if he had been sued in the initial
litigation rather than treated as a witness. A uniform "summary
judgment plus" test, however, would prevent plaintiffs from
gaming the system in such a manner, for the result would be the
same regardless of whether the anonymous speaker is identified as
a defendant or a witness.
C. Erring on the Side of Speakers, Not Plaintiffs
Perhaps the most common criticism of the Dendrite, Cahill,
and Mobilisa tests is that they set the bar too high for plaintiffs
seeking to recover damages for injuries that have occurred over the
Internet medium. For instance, Professor S. Elizabeth Malloy has
argued that the Cahill test "makes it extremely difficult for
defamation victims to bring suit against anonymous bloggers"
because "[t]he standard created is far too sympathetic to
anonymous bloggers and fails to address important issues facing
victims of defamation."
60
The problem with this argument is that neither Cahill nor
any other test imposing the summary judgment requirement bars a
plaintiff from bringing suit against an anonymous speaker.
Furthermore, the test is only "sympathetic" to speakers in the sense
that it considers the strength of the plaintiffs case at an earlier
stage in the proceedings than is typical - however, this is
balanced by plaintiffs not having to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on issues that are dependent on the speaker's identity.
59 Kathryn W. Tate, California's Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary and
Commentary on its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 802-03
(2000).
60 S. Elizabeth Malloy, Anonymous Bloggers and Defamation: Balancing
Interests on the Internet, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2006).
2008-2009
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Given that the plaintiff prevails in fewer than ten percent of all
media libel cases, 61 courts should have to err on the side of
preserving a speaker's First Amendment rights, and only allow
disclosure in the relatively rare circumstances where a plaintiff can
demonstrate that he is more likely than not to succeed on the
merits.
One must also remember that the civil litigation process is
not intended as a tool to harass or shame individuals with whom
the plaintiff disagrees. 62 While there are benefits to holding
individuals accountable for what they say on the Internet, the
judicial system is not the appropriate means to achieve those
benefits when the speaker has not actually committed any
wrongdoing. Extralegal methods, such as offering "bounties" in
exchange for an anonymous speaker's identity, are more
appropriate for this purpose.
63
D. Legislative, Not Judicial, Action is Required
Finally, technology policy in this area should not be
determined by the courts, but by the legislative branch. As
discussed earlier, the present system of allowing the courts to
determine what tests to apply has resulted in substantial confusion,
with no clear, uniform standard emerging. Congress, through
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, can instantly
create a uniform standard that eliminates all uncertainty, while also
minimizing transaction costs.
Furthermore, Congress is in a better position than the courts
to create potential remedies for the wrongful disclosure of an
anonymous speaker's identity. For instance, under current law,
there are no remedies available to anonymous speakers who have
their identities wrongfully disclosed when a plaintiff subpoenas an
intermediary without complying with the Mobilisa or Cahill notice
requirements. Congress could more easily create appropriate
remedies than the federal courts.
64
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
President Barack Obama will have many challenges to face
over the course of the next four years. Though Internet anonymity
and other online civil rights issues have not generated as much
media attention or public interest as other matters, they continue to
remain important and should be addressed by the new
administration. President Obama should lobby Congress to resolve
the current state of confusion surrounding this issue through
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that would
codify the Mobilisa "summary judgment-plus" standard and
require a litigant to notify an anonymous speaker, demonstrate that
his or her claim can withstand a motion for summary judgment,
and meet a balancing test before obtaining the relief they seek.
federal courts, to conduct a weighing of interests and determine whether a
procedural rule is necessary to further the public interest).
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